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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, when I began to represent foster children in 
the historic Cook County Juvenile Court in Chicago, Illinois,1 I dis­
covered the deep and enduring connections children have to their 
kin, particularly their parents and siblings.  I represented children 
of parents on whom the court and agencies had given up—families 
whose legal ties had been or were on the precipice of being termi­
nated.  In contrast to the state actors, the children remained deeply 
connected to their parents, even when they were resigned to never 
again live with them.  There were also siblings who asked me to 
fight against termination of their parents’ parental rights or to resist 
their adoptions because they did not want to be separated from 
each other or to have no guaranty that they could continue to know 
and see each other or their parents; others resisted adoption be­
cause they feared their names would change. 
My colleagues and I fought on their behalf for legal protections 
that would preserve their identities and bridge these connections. 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Clinical Affairs, Washington Univer­
sity Law School. 
1. Chicago’s juvenile court, founded in 1899, is credited as the first juvenile court 
in America. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE  JUSTICE IN THE  MAKING, at xxv-xxvi 
(2004). 
1 
2 
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In other words, we fought to maintain legal, social, and family con­
nections after termination of parental rights and into the adoption.2 
Unfortunately, the law did not recognize these ties.  Legally, the 
parent-child relationship was “all or nothing” and our legal strate­
gies to protect these connections were largely unsuccessful.3  These 
strategies included seeking termination of parental rights orders 
that incorporated post-termination and post-adoption visitation or­
ders or constrained the power of the court-appointed guardian with 
authority to consent to the children’s adoption.  Such constraints 
included authorizing the guardian to permit adoption only by per­
sons willing to help the children maintain connections to their par­
ents or siblings or to persons who would continue to be bound by 
post-termination and adoption visitation agreements to which they 
had already assented at the termination-of-parental-rights stage.4 
Our social work consisted of introducing to each other pre-
adoptive foster parents of siblings who were to be adopted into dif­
ferent families.5  We made these introductions to enable the adop­
tive parents to maintain sibling contact after adoption and to serve 
as support for each other.  Through this work, we aimed to create 
extended kin networks of adults tied together through their 
(adopted) children.  We hoped these networks would keep children 
connected across legal-family borders and develop shared knowl­
edge, information, and ongoing support for the adoptive parents 
and the children they adopted.  We also negotiated and reduced to 
writing unenforceable agreements between birth and prospective 
adoptive parents for ongoing contact after adoption.  While this 
work did not carry the imprimatur of law, we hoped for compliance 
and that the process itself would communicate the vitality of these 
connections to the child welfare system and the families who would 
adopt our clients. 
2. E.g., In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ill. 1993) (denying motions brought on 
behalf of children seeking to enforce trial court orders conditioning adoption on the 
adoptive parents’ willingness to permit post-adoption contact); In re Donte A., 631 
N.E.2d 257, 257-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (refusing to limit the power of a legal guardian 
by requiring that the guardian condition its consent to adoption on finding prospective 
adoptive parents that would allow post-adoption sibling visitation). 
3. See generally In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702; In re Donte A., 631 N.E.2d 257. But 
see Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-10 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding constitu­
tionally protected liberty interests in sibling visitation). 
4. In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d at 708; In re Donte A., 631 N.E.2d at 257-58. 
5. In those days, foster parents were not likely to know each other.  Permanency 
planning was solely in the domain of caseworkers who transported children from their 
various homes to the state social services offices or fast food restaurants for family 
visits. 
3 
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At the time, there was very little literature and even less law 
acknowledging or protecting these enduring connections.6  Not 
even two decades had passed since the Adoption Assistance and 
Child Welfare Act (“Adoption Assistance Act”) became law in 
1980.7  Among other things, this act deposed the anonymous infant 
adoption orthodoxy that had defined adoption for much of the cen­
tury.8  In the 1980s, the adoption paradigm was still one that con­
templated a clean break from the past, extinguishing all biological 
family connections (except in the case of step-parent adoption) and 
even changing the child’s birth certificate to reflect the adoptive 
parents as the child’s birth parents.9  By designating adoption as the 
privileged goal for foster children who cannot be reunited with their 
families and reducing barriers to and providing financial support for 
adoption, the Adoption Assistance Act challenged the notion that 
older children were not adoptable.10 
This challenge failed, however, to account for the fact that 
these older children carried with them known pasts and conscious 
relationships.  Indeed, even children and adults adopted as infants 
carry their pasts with them, perhaps more so because their pasts are 
unknown.11  Lawmakers and social workers were slow to respond 
6. In fact, the American Law Institute digest of post-adoption parent-child visita­
tion cases, first composed in 1990, did not exist when I began my research. See gener­
ally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Postadoption Visitation by Natural Parent, 78 
A.L.R.4th 218 (1990).  Since 1990, the digest has filled out considerably, with the vast 
majority of cases dated after 1990. See generally id.  Moreover, the number of adoption 
with contact statutes continues to increase. Compare Annette R. Appell, Increasing 
Options to Improve Permanency: Considerations in Drafting an Adoption with Contact 
Statute, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., Fall 1998, at 24, 36-42 (describing thirteen adoption with 
contact statutes), with infra Appendix (reporting on twenty such statutes). 
7. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 
§§ 420-28, 470-76, 94 Stat. 500, 501-13, 516-21 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-76 
(2006)). 
8. See Elizabeth S. Cole, Advocating for Adoption Services, in FOSTER CHILDREN 
IN THE COURTS 449 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (describing the history of adoption and the 
myths that foster care adoption undercuts).  The dominance of the infant adoption par­
adigm persisted even though, at the time, infant adoptions comprised a minority of 
adoptions.  Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative 
Adoption: Can It Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 483, 488-89 (1996). 
9. Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of 
Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376-83 (2001). 
10. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, §§ 420, 470. 
11. PETER L. BENSON, ANU R. SHARMA & EUGENE C. ROEHLKEPARTAIN, 
GROWING UP ADOPTED: A PORTRAIT OF ADOLESCENTS & THEIR FAMILIES 26 (1994) 
(noting that seventy percent of adolescent girls and fifty-seven percent of adolescent 
boys adopted as infants reported that they wished to meet their birth parents); see also 
DAVID M. BRODZINSKY, MARSHALL D. SCHECHTER & ROBIN  MARANTZ  HENIG, BE­
ING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF 11 (1992). 
4 
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to these contradictions.  At the time the Adoption Assistance Act 
became law, there was little social science research regarding the 
adoption of foster children12 and scant interrogation of the closed­
adoption-rebirth paradigm.13  Yet it would appear that the same 
forces that were leading to more organic and inclusive notions of 
adoption, including the Adoption Assistance Act, were pushing to­
ward opening adoption in practice and law. 
Open adoption has now become the norm in practice for all 
types of adoption.14  Common law is slow to sanction open adop­
tion because adoption itself is a statutory creation, the sine qua non 
of which has become the complete substitution of adoptive ties for 
birth ties.  Most state adoption statutes continue to embody the old 
12. For exceptions, see, for example, ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ANNETTE BARAN & 
REUBEN PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED RECORD 
ON  ADOPTEES, BIRTH  PARENTS, AND  ADOPTIVE  PARENTS (1978) (reconceptualizing 
adoption as a lifelong process for birth parents, adoptees, and adoptive parents); Rob­
ert Borgman, Antecedents and Consequences of Parental Rights Termination for Abused 
and Neglected Children, 60 CHILD  WELFARE 391 (1981) [hereinafter Borgman, Ante­
cedents and Consequences] (study illustrating the children’s resistance to adoption with­
out post-adoption family contact guarantees); Robert Borgman, The Consequences of 
Open and Closed Adoption for Older Children, 61 CHILD WELFARE 217 (1982) [herein­
after Borgman, Consequences of Open and Closed Adoption] (illustrating, inter alia, 
that open adoption can help ease birth parent and foster children’s resistance to 
adoption). 
13. Exceptions include Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclu­
sive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has 
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 880-81, 912-44 (1984) (noting the variety of parent-like 
relationships adults have to children); Borgman, Consequences of Open and Closed 
Adoption, supra note 12, at 218-22; Andre P. Derdeyn, Andrew R. Rogoff & Scott W. R 
Williams, Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Parental Rights After Long-Term Fos­
ter Care, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (1978) (noting, inter alia, that courts are some­
times hesitant to terminate parental rights because of the affective ties between parents 
and child); Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 
457-74 (1983) (critiquing the exclusive parenthood model for foster children); Michael 
S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of 
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Ter­
mination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 670-74 (1976) (noting persistence of 
ties foster children feel to their parents). 
14. Harold D. Grotevant et al., Many Faces of Openness in Adoption: Perspectives 
of Adopted Adolescents and Their Parents, 10(3-4) ADOPTION Q. 79, 80 (2007).  Adop­
tion of older children, step-children, and related children, which for years predominated 
adoption, were generally open in the sense that the birth relations and adoptive rela­
tions were known to each other.  Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through 
Adoption: Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 
997, 1001-02 (1995) [hereinafter Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption].  What is 
most striking is that infant adoptions are increasingly open.  Mardell Groth et al., An 
Agency Moves Toward Open Adoption of Infants, 66 CHILD WELFARE 247, 248 (1987); 
Susan M. Henney et al., The Impact of Openness on Adoption Agency Practices: A 
Longitudinal Perspective, 6(3) ADOPTION Q. 31, 34 (2003). 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE101.txt unknown Seq: 5 10-MAY-10 14:21 
2010] CHILD-CENTERED ADOPTION 5 
norms, treating adoption as a rebirth that severs and erases all ties 
and then seals all information about the birth family.15  Of course, 
adoptive parents gain the rights of parenthood through adoption, 
including the right to determine with whom their children will asso­
ciate; grants of visitation rights over their objection or otherwise 
providing legal guarantees that others can have contact with the 
adoptee remains exceptional, but is on the rise.16 
This Article reflects on the increasingly widespread and nor­
mative movement toward the practice and regulation of honoring 
children’s pre-adoptive and often ongoing relationships to birth 
family members.  This Article first rehearses the current state of 
statutory and judicial post-adoption contact regulation, with em­
phasis on adoption with contact, a regulatory scheme that best re­
flects the autonomy of the new adoptive family, but nevertheless 
may not protect the child’s interests when the adults cannot come 
to an agreement regarding post-adoption contact.  This Article then 
presents a brief overview of pertinent studies of post-adoption con­
tact here and in the United Kingdom, where the law permits courts 
to order post-adoption contact without the agreement of the adop­
tive parents.  The regulation and study of open adoptive families 
reveal them to be dynamic, collaborative, porous, and rich collec­
tives that center around the child’s interests.  The Article concludes 
with some findings and recommendations from the United King­
dom’s experience that are instructive for the United States. 
I. THE REGULATION OF POST-ADOPTION CONTACT 
Although open adoption encompasses a vast array of relation­
ships and is largely unregulated, there are primarily two types of 
regulatory schemes that sanction and enforce post-adoption contact 
among birth relatives, adoptive parents, and the adoptee: 
(1) those permitting courts to enforce post adoption contact 
agreements among the parties, i.e., adoption with contact stat­
utes; and (2) those permitting the court to impose post adoption 
visitation or contact without regard to the parties’ agreement. 
The major distinction between these two categories of statutes is 
that adoption with contact is, by definition, based on an agree­
15. See generally Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE 
L.J. 1077 (2003) (exploring social and legal history of adoption); Samuels, supra note 9, R 
at 373-86 (tracing the history of these norms). 
16. See infra Part II. 
6 
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ment between the parties, while the second category does not 
require that the parties agree.17 
A. Court-Imposed Open Adoption 
Court-imposed post-adoption contact is predominately statu-
tory,18 but can be equitable.19  Court-imposed post-adoption­
contact statutes empower courts to order visits at the request of 
third parties, usually nonparent relatives, but also birth parents and 
siblings, even when the adoptive parents object.20  This type of open 
adoption can be useful, particularly when there are people impor­
tant to the child, but whose importance the adoptive parents do not 
appreciate; this form of open adoption also may be appropriate 
when there are logistical constraints precluding agreement regard­
ing contact.21 
At the same time, this form of open adoption challenges the 
autonomy of the adoptive parents and the new adoptive family.  In 
truth though, this new adoptive family is enmeshed in the child’s 
birth family in and through the adoptee, who inevitably brings these 
connections into the adoption.  When adoptive families do not rec­
ognize this phenomenon, it could be problematic for the child be­
cause these connections are important to adoptees, who are likely 
to revisit birth connections cyclically throughout their lives.22 
Moreover, adoptive parents who do not have contact with birth 
parents or relatives may be more likely to think poorly of the child’s 
17. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post Adoption Contact Statutes, Part II: 
Court-Imposed Post Adoption Contact, 4(2) ADOPTION Q. 101, 101 (2000) [hereinafter 
Appell, Court-Imposed Post Adoption Contact] (citation omitted); see also Appell, 
Blending Families Through Adoption, supra note 14, at 1020 (discussing cases in which R 
courts ordered post-adoption contact without explicit statutory authority).  Massachu­
setts provides both mechanisms as it has an adoption with contact statute, MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 210, §§ 6C, 6D, 6E (2008), and has recognized the equitable authority of the 
court to order such contact without agreement of the parties.  Adoption of Vito, 728 
N.E.2d 292, 300 (Mass. 2000). 
18. Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 301-03; see also Annette R. Appell, Court-
Ordered Third Party Visitation and Family Autonomy, 3(4) ADOPTION Q. 93, 98-101 
(2000) [hereinafter Appell, Court-Ordered Third Party Visitation] (rehearsing law re­
garding third party visitation). 
19. See, e.g., Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 739-41 (Conn. 1988); Loveless v. 
Michalak, 522 N.E.2d 873, 874-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 
300. 
20. Appell, Court-Imposed Post Adoption Contact, supra note 17, at 101-02. R 
21. See infra Part I.C (discussing logistical challenges). 
22. See generally BRODZINSKY, SCHECHTER & HENIG, supra note 11 (describing R 
how adoptees revisit their adoption and birth connections at each developmental phase 
of their lives). 
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birth relations,23 perceptions that the child may absorb as negative 
messages about the child’s worth or that might produce cognitive 
dissonance for the child who has loyalties to the birth family. 
B. Adoption with Contact Statutes 
As the persistence and depth of birth connections have pushed 
adoption to become more open,24 there has been an increase in the 
prevalence of agreements among birth and adoptive parents for 
post-adoption contact.25  In a number of states this phenomenon 
raised concerns about the fairness of private ordering in these open 
adoptions and whether the parties, particularly birth parents, un­
derstood the nonbinding effect of the post-adoption-contact agree­
ments.26  These considerations, along with a growing recognition of 
the importance of birth heritage to adoptees, have led a number of 
states to codify such adoptions.27  These statutes, in effect, create a 
new form of adoption: one that, from the outset, acknowledges the 
child’s pre-adoption birth connections and explicitly brings them 
into the new adoptive family, often as part of the adoption decree 
itself.28 
Adoption with contact statutes share at least two principal 
strengths.  First, they are collaborative because they are based on 
the agreement of those who will have the contact and not on a 
court-imposed order.  Second, their design minimizes court inter­
vention during and after the adoption proceeding.  For example, 
most of the statutes articulate guidelines for creation, modification, 
and enforcement of the agreement after adoption.  Moreover, and, 
perhaps most importantly, these statutes explicitly state that any vi­
23. Karie M. Frasch, Devon Brooks & Richard P. Barth, Openness and Contact in 
Foster Care Adoptions: An Eight-Year Follow-Up, 49 FAM. REL. 435, 441 (2000). 
24. See infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. R 
25. Annette R. Appell, Survey of State Utilization of Adoption with Contact, 6(4) 
ADOPTION Q. 75, 79 (2003) [hereinafter Appell, Survey]. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427(1) (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 127.187(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35(A) (West Supp. 
2008); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 26.33.295(2) (West Supp. 2010).  Indiana law requires the agreement to be ac­
knowledged by the birth and adoptive parents and be filed with the court. IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 31-19-16-2(4)(B), 31-19-16-3 (West 2008).  Louisiana, Maryland, and Rhode 
Island also require the agreement to be filed with the court. LA. CHILD. CODE  ANN. 
art. 1269.4 (Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-331(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2006); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1(b)(3) (2003).  Massachusetts requires the agreement to be 
“incorporated but not merged into the adoption decree, and shall survive as an inde­
pendent contract.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6C(d) (2008). 
8 
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olation or failure of the agreement is not grounds to set aside the 
adoption or parental rights relinquishment.29 
A growing number of states have passed legislation that ac­
knowledges, accounts for, and regulates post-adoption contact.30 
California’s statute articulates the primary considerations under­
girding these laws and reflects broad notions of kinship and 
identity:31 
The Legislature finds and declares that some adoptive chil­
dren may benefit from either direct or indirect contact with birth 
relatives, including the birth parent or parents or an Indian tribe, 
after being adopted.  Postadoption contact agreements are in­
tended to ensure children of an achievable level of continuing 
contact when contact is beneficial to the children and the agree­
ments are voluntarily entered into by birth relatives, including 
the birth parent or parents or an Indian tribe, and adoptive par­
ents.  Nothing in this section requires all of the listed parties to 
participate in the development of a postadoption contact agree­
ment in order for the agreement to be entered into.32 
By the end of the last decade of the twentieth century, fifteen 
states had adopted statutes that permitted birth relatives and adop­
tive parents to enter into enforceable open adoption agreements.33 
Currently, there are at least twenty.  I highlight these statutes be­
cause they protect the autonomy of adoptive parents to enter into 
29. Appell, Survey, supra note 25, at 76-77. R 
30. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-116.01 (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West 
2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715(h)-(n) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 63.0427 (West 2005); IND. CODE  ANN. §§ 31-19-16-1 to -8 (West 2008); LA. CHILD. 
CODE  ANN. arts. 1269.1-.8 (Supp. 2010); MD. CODE  ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-308, -331, 
-345, -3A-08, -3B-07 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, §§ 6C-6E (2008); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.58 (West 2007); MONT. CODE  ANN. § 42-5-301 (2009); NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 43-162 to -165 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.187-.1895 (Lexis-
Nexis Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35 (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. DOM. REL. 
LAW § 112-b (McKinney Supp. 2010); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 383-c(5)(b)(ii) (McKin­
ney Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1 (2003); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112 (2002); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.295 (West Supp. 2010); W.V. CODE ANN. § 48-22-704(e) (Lex­
isNexis 2004); see also infra Appendix. 
31. See Appell, Survey, supra note 25, at 79 (reporting that concern for the child’s R 
interest in open adoption was a primary motivation behind enacting the adoption with 
contact statutes). 
32. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(a). 
33. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post-Adoption Contact Statutes, Part I: Adop­
tion with Contact, 4(1) ADOPTION Q. 81, 82 (2000).  Many state legislatures enacted 
grandparent visitation statutes, many of which apply after adoption, but those arose out 
of a different movement and most frequently apply in related adoptions.  Appell, 
Court-Ordered Third Party Visitation, supra note 18, at 99. R 
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an adoption on their own terms and internalize the type of collabo­
ration that is necessary to make the contact successful.  This is not 
to say that the court-ordered post-adoption contact model does not 
have value or that blended families cannot come to terms with 
these imposed conditions,34 but the agreement of the parties models 
a more private and organic family operation and is more consistent 
with U.S. norms of family autonomy. 
These adoptions with contact statutes make clear that when 
open adoptions are entered into under such a statute, parties have 
rights and obligations.35  Those open adoption agreements entered 
into outside these mechanisms continue to be unregulated.  Major 
factors motivating states to adopt such regulations were the desira­
bility of providing procedures for these arrangements, the wisdom 
of clarifying when these arrangements are extralegal and when they 
are subject to enforcement,36 and, of course, the growing under­
standing of children’s interest in openness.37  This codification, also 
known as cooperative adoption, models and accommodates family 
privacy and the existential facts of adoption: that the birth family 
and adoptive family are tied together through the child and that 
adopted children are “forever members of two families—the one 
that gave them life and the one that nurtured them through the 
process of adoption.”38 
These adoption with contact statutes, informed as much by the 
political process as academic research, apply only to some adop­
tions and to some family members and not others.  For example, 
some statutes limit cooperative adoption to parents who have con­
sented to the adoption and preclude parents whose parental rights 
were involuntarily terminated.39  Such statutes are inconsistent with 
34. See, e.g., CAROLE  SMITH & JANETTE  LOGAN, AFTER  ADOPTION: DIRECT 
CONTACT AND  RELATIONSHIPS 44-50 (2004); Janette Logan & Carole Smith, Face-to-
Face Contact Post Adoption: Views from the Triangles, 35 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 3, 16-17 
(2005); Elsbeth Neil, Contact After Adoption: The Role of Agencies in Making and Sup­
porting Plans, 26 ADOPTION & FOSTERING 25, 25 (2002); Carole Smith, Trust v. Law: 
Promoting and Safeguarding Post-Adoption Contact, 27 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 
315, 315-16 (2005). 
35. Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption, supra note 14, at 1003-08. R 
36. Appell, Survey, supra note 25, at 76-79. R 
37. Id. at 79. 
38. Kenneth W. Watson, The Case for Open Adoption, PUB. WELFARE, Fall 1988, 
at 24, 24. 
39. See, e,g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715(h)-(n) (West 2004); IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 31-19-16-1 to -8 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-5-301 (2009); N.Y. DOM. 
REL. LAW § 112-b (McKinney Supp. 2010); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 383-c(5)(b)(ii) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 2010); see also infra Appendix. 
10 
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research that suggests parents who contested the termination and 
adoption can be successful participants in post-adoption contact.40 
Moreover, children’s attachments to parents are not necessarily de­
pendent on the way parental rights were terminated.41  A number 
of statutes confine the persons who can enter into enforceable post­
adoption-contact agreements to parents or relatives to whom chil­
dren have a substantial relationship,42 even though research sug­
gests that a number of relatives (especially grandparents) can be 
important participants in post-adoption contact and that many in­
fant adoptions involve ongoing contact with them.43 
In addition, although the statutes are commendable for their 
respect for the adoptive kin network’s autonomy, most do not pro­
vide for counseling or other mechanisms to help the participants 
understand their rights and responsibilities, the value and purpose 
of adoption with contact, or the special challenges of blending mul­
tiple families.44  In the end, though, these statutes signify an impor­
tant message about the value and existence of adoptive kin 
networks, the endurance of biological kinship, and the status of 
post-adoption-contact agreements entered into pursuant to these 
statutes and those entered into without legal sanction.45 
In contrast to court-imposed open adoption, the adoption with 
contact statutes have produced remarkably little litigation.46  Most 
litigation that has occurred addresses whether open adoption agree­
ments not entered into under the statute are enforceable under the 
40. See infra text accompanying notes 99-130 (rehearsing studies regarding court- R 
ordered and consensual post-adoption contact). 
41. See Borgman, Antecedents and Consequences, supra note 12, at 396-98 (study R 
indicating that children were most attached to their parents after contested termination 
of parental rights proceedings, but that when parents and case workers helped them 
accept the adoption, they remained connected to their parents). 
42. See infra Appendix. 
43. See infra Parts II.D-E. 
44. A number of statutes do provide dispute resolution mechanisms if a dispute 
regarding the agreement arises later. See infra Appendix. 
45. See, e.g., In re M.M., 589 N.E.2d 687, 690-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Weinschel v. 
Strople, 466 A.2d 1301, 1306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); Fast v. Moore, 135 P.3d 387, 
388 (Or. Ct. App. 2006); see also infra Appendix. 
46. Appell, Survey, supra note 25, at 75-76.  Massachusetts presents a possible R 
exception, but much of the litigation in that state preceded the Massachusetts adoption 
with contact statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6C (2008), and appears to revolve 
around disputes regarding court-imposed contact, a form of open adoption that does 
not fall under the adoption with contact rubric. See infra notes 54-59, 77-94 and accom- R 
panying text. 
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statute.47  In one of the rare cases involving litigation on the merits 
of a statutory adoption with contact agreement, the Minnesota Su­
preme Court held that the contact agreement created a contractual 
right that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause pro­
tected.48  This interest afforded the birth father, who had filed suit 
to enforce the agreement, a right to an evidentiary hearing, includ­
ing the right to confront witnesses in the enforcement action.49 
This case is significant, not just because of its rarity, but for its 
articulation of the nature and extent of the contact agreement.  The 
decision defined the nature of the birth parent’s rights under the 
agreement to be contractual, rather than parental, underscoring the 
important legal fact that the rights the birth parent gains through 
adoption with contact are not parental rights.  At the same time, the 
court’s application of the Mathews v. Eldridge50 test regarding what 
process was due the father took very seriously his interest and the 
risk of erroneous deprivation.  Thus, the court required an actual 
hearing regarding the propriety of terminating contact,51 determin­
ing that the father’s interest outweighed the burden on the state to 
afford a full hearing.52  Finally, clarifying the burden of proof in an 
enforcement action, a subject on which the statute was silent, the 
47. E.g., In re M.B., 921 N.E.2d 494, 499-501 (Ind. 2009) (holding that an agree­
ment that purported to be a precondition to termination of parental rights and adoption 
violated the statute but was nevertheless enforceable); Adoption of Edgar, 853 N.E.2d 
1068, 1075 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (statute does not apply to court-sanctioned open 
adoptions not entered into by agreement of the parties); Moore, 135 P.3d at 388 (post­
adoption-contact agreement entered into after the adoption was not enforceable under 
the statute); In re Tara P., 836 A.2d 219, 222 (R.I. 2003) (the court was not required to 
enter open-adoption decree that did not meet the statutory requirement when the fif­
teen-year-old adoptee did not agree and the mother and adoptive parent, the grand­
mother, did not jointly negotiate an agreement for post-adoption); see also In re 
Kimberly S., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 744 (Ct. App. 1999) (parent not entitled to notice of 
post-adoption contact option); In re Zachery D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407, 410 (Ct. App. 
1999) (same). But see C.O. v. Doe, 757 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Minn. 2008) (action brought 
to enforce a 2005 adoption contact agreement). 
48. C.O., 757 N.W.2d at 349 (holding that the birth father had a property interest 
in the contractual right established pursuant to the statute).  In In re M.B., the Indiana 
Supreme Court held that the mother had a statutory right to notice and an opportunity 
to be heard before a court could terminate her post-adoption visitation with her chil­
dren. In re M.B., 921 N.E.2d at 501. 
49. In C.O., there was no hearing and much of the evidence on which the trial 
court relied was out-of-court statements by the birth father’s ex-girlfriend. C.O., 757 
N.W.2d at 350-51. 
50. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
51. C.O., 757 N.W.2d at 350-51.  The court did not, however, require a height­
ened standard of proof, holding that in the absence of statutory guidance, the standard 
would be a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 353. 
52. Id. at 351-52. 
12 
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court held that the burden was on the party seeking “to benefit 
from a statutory provision”—here, the adoptive parents who were 
seeking to establish that exceptional circumstances existed to termi­
nate the agreement.53 
Massachusetts appears to have the most reported post-
adoption contact litigation of all of the states, the vast majority of 
which does not appear to have arisen under the adoption with con­
tact statute, probably as a result of Massachusetts’ relatively long-
standing and robust practice of court-ordered post-adoption and 
post-termination family contact.54  In fact, so rooted is this practice 
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Adoption of 
Vito, explicitly rejected the argument that statutory amendments 
providing for adoption with contact and post-termination contact 
agreements removed the judiciary’s equitable authority to impose 
post-termination and post-adoption contact.55  It is not surprising, 
then, that there continues to be litigation regarding the court’s dis­
cretion to order post-adoption contact, which is limited only by the 
best interests of the child standard, a notoriously indefinite 
measure.56 
In fact, the Vito court recognized this danger of increased liti­
gation, as well as the risks of incursion into the adoptive parents’ 
parental rights, when courts order post-adoption contact without 
the adoptive parents’ agreement.57  Even so, Vito affirmed the con­
tinued authority of courts to impose post-adoption contact when 
best for the child—just one year after enactment of the adoption 
with contact statute.58  At that time, the courts appeared to equate 
best interests in the context of post-adoption contact with displayed 
bonding between the birthparent and the child.59  This equitable 
53. Id. at 352-53. 
54. Infra text accompanying notes 77-94. R 
55. Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 300-04 (Mass. 2000). 
56. See Adoption of Lars, 702 N.E.2d 1187, 1192 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (noting 
“the breadth of the judge’s discretion with respect to selection of adoption plans and 
the recognition of postadoption visitation by the biological parents as an element to be 
considered in an evaluation of a child’s best interests”); see also Annette R. Appell & 
Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the 
Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 63, 74-82 (1995). 
57. Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 304. 
58. See An Act Relative to Adoption and Promoting the Welfare of Children, ch. 
3, § 17, 1999 Mass Acts 2, 10-14 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d) (2008)). 
59. E.g., Adoption of Greta, 729 N.E.2d 273, 281 (Mass. 2000); Adoption of Vito, 
728 N.E.2d at 303.  The Supreme Judicial Court recently, in dicta, noted that the “con­
siderations beyond bonding may be relevant” to the child’s interests in post-adoption 
contact, such that post-adoption contact may be in the interests even of children with­
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power may provide important safeguards for children, but it also 
may undermine the autonomy of the new blended families that 
adoption creates. 
C.	 Statutory Post-Termination-of-Parental-Rights Contact 
Provisions 
Most of the adoption with contact statutes contemplate an 
agreement between the birth parents or other birth relatives and 
the adoptive parents that would be entered into at the time of adop­
tion.  However, it is not uncommon, particularly in foster care 
cases, for the termination proceeding and the adoption proceeding 
to be separated in time, place, and constituents.60  Indeed, at the 
time of the termination of parental rights, there may not be a desig­
nated adoptive family.61  This discontinuity creates gaps between 
the time of, and personnel involved in, the creation of the agree­
ment and the adoption.  Moreover, not all children whose parental 
rights are terminated will be adopted,62 but they will still have ties 
to siblings or other relatives.  Massachusetts63 and Florida64 are 
among the few states with statutes that address the lacuna between 
termination of parental rights and adoption, a stage that, unfortu­
nately, could last for a lifetime.65  Nevada provides various mecha­
nisms to bridge the gap between termination of parental rights and 
out exhibited ties to their parents.  Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d 552, 559 (Mass. 2009);
 
see also infra text accompanying notes 83-94. R
 
60. See, e.g., In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702, 706-07 (Ill. 1993); In re Donte A., 631 
N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).  Both M.M. and Donte A. involved children seek­
ing to compel their state guardian to permit adoption only by persons who would agree 
to post-adoption contact with birth siblings (and parents as well in M.M.’s case); in 
those cases, termination of parental rights—which authorized the guardian to consent 
to adoption—occurred in a separate court and proceeding and at a different time. 
61. E.g., Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d at 553 (at time of termination, there was 
no identified adoptive family). 
62. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termi­
nation of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two 
States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 140 (1995) (estimating based on disparities between numbers 
of termination of parental rights cases and adoptions in Michigan and New York “that 
there are somewhere between 40,000 and 80,000 children who have been freed for 
adoption but have not yet been adopted nationwide”). 
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d).  Nevada addresses this gap for purposes of 
ensuring that the adoptive parents carry the post-adoption agreement into the adoption 
proceedings. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.509, 127.1875, 127.188 (LexisNexis 2004 & 
Supp. 2005). 
64.	 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7) (West Supp. 2010). 
65. See Guggenheim, supra note 62, at 140 (“Modern reforms aimed at helping R 
families in need have resulted in creating the highest number of unnatural orphans in 
the history of the United States.”). 
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adoption with contact.66  These include requiring the adoptive par­
ents, their attorneys, and the agencies to notify the court regarding 
the contact agreement,67 requiring the adoption court to inquire of 
the adoptive parents as to whether there is a contact agreement in 
place,68 and permitting the birth parents to bring a civil damages 
action when the adoptive parents have concealed the existence of 
an agreement before the adoption court.69 
Florida’s statute permits the court that terminates parental 
rights to order “communication” or “contact” between the child 
and “parents, siblings, or relatives of the parent whose rights are 
terminated” when in the best interests of the child.70  “[T]he nature 
and frequency of the communication or contact must be set forth in 
written order and may be reviewed upon motion of any party,” in­
cluding “an identified prospective adoptive parent.”71  The statute 
further requires the court to review the “nature and frequency of 
the communication or contact” once the child is placed for 
adoption.72 
The Massachusetts provision, added in 1999 to the termination 
of parental rights statute,73 explicitly reserves the right of the birth 
parent and the person petitioning to terminate parental rights to 
enter into “an agreement for post-termination contact or communi­
cation.”74  The statute also grants jurisdiction to the termination 
court to resolve disputes relating to the agreement.75  The agree­
ment itself becomes “null and void” once an adoption or guardian­
ship decree is entered, but does not “prohibit a birth parent who 
has entered into a post-termination agreement from entering into 
an agreement for post-adoption contact or communication pursuant 
to section 6C once an adoptive family has been identified.”76 
Even before Massachusetts added the explicit provisions for 
post-termination contact in 1999, its courts were considering post­
66. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.509, 127.1875, 127.188. 
67. Id. § 127.1875. 
68. Id. § 127.188. 
69. Id. § 41.509. 
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b) (West Supp. 2010). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. An Act Relative to Adoption and Promoting the Welfare of Children, ch. 3, 
§ 17, 1999 Mass Acts 2, 10-14 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d) (2008)). 
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
15 
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termination and post-adoption parental visitation.77  They did so 
based on equitable principles: 
Given the “broad, equitable powers” of courts in this area, we 
see no reason why a judge dealing with a petition to dispense 
with parental consent may not evaluate “the plan proposed by 
the department” in relation to all the elements the judge finds 
are in the child’s best interests, including parental visitation.78 
This is a longstanding and oft-used power of the Massachusetts 
termination of parental rights and adoption courts.79  In Adoption 
of Lars, a Massachusetts appellate court upheld termination of pa­
rental rights orders that mandated any subsequent adoption decree 
to include a birthparent-child visitation order.80  Although this case 
predated the 1999 adoption with contact provisions,81 the court an­
ticipated (and assumed) the inevitability of adoptive parent agree­
ment to post-adoption contact when it upheld the visitation order 
against the child welfare agency’s objection: 
Here, where the children had not yet been placed in a prospec­
tive adoptive home as of the time of trial, visitation has not been 
judicially thrust upon identified adoptive parents.  When such 
prospective parents have been chosen, they will, by their willing­
ness to adopt, have implicitly, if not expressly, consented to the 
visits ordered by the judge.82 
Even after the 1999 addition of the Massachusetts statutory 
adoption with contact and enforceable post-termination of parental 
rights visitation provisions, courts continued to order post-termina­
tion visits based on judicial equitable authority.  For example, 
Adoption of Terrence considered whether it was in the best interests 
77. E.g., In re Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 467 N.E.2d 861, 866 (Mass. 1984). 
78. Id. (citations omitted); see also Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Mass. 
2000) (noting equitable authority and citing long line of cases acknowledging this 
authority). 
79. See Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 299 (citing nine cases in which such or­
ders had been entered since 1984). 
80. Adoption of Lars, 702 N.E.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
81. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d).  The statute provides, 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the petitioner and a 
birth parent from entering into an agreement for post-termination contact or 
communication.  The court issuing the termination decree under this section 
shall have jurisdiction to resolve matters concerning the agreement.  Such 
agreement shall become null and void upon the entry of an adoption or guard­
ianship decree. 
Id. 
82. Adoption of Lars, 702 N.E.2d at 1191. 
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of Terrence to order minimal visits with his cognitively limited, 
mentally ill mother after termination even though there had been 
no statutory agreement for such visits and, apparently, without the 
court knowing what the child’s actual adoption plan was.83 
This resistance to the legislative adoption and termination with 
contact provisions surfaced most recently regarding the pseudony­
mously named Rico and his father.84  Rico, then a twelve-year-old 
raised in foster care since the age of three, and his father shared a 
mutual bond and desire to see each other but, for some reason 
could not be reunited.85  The court terminated Rico’s parents’ pa­
rental rights after a thirteen-day trial in 2006 when Rico was nine.86 
At the same time, the court found that Rico’s best interests lay in 
ongoing contact with his father and siblings after termination of pa­
rental rights and adoption, but the court made no order to that ef­
fect.87  Instead, the court made the gratuitous finding that Rico’s 
legal custodian, the child-welfare agency, had the discretion to af­
ford visitation.88 
The court’s failure to act affirmatively to protect these relation­
ships was odd, particularly when Massachusetts law provides both 
equitable and statutory options to protect what was by all accounts 
a strong and mutual connection between father and son.  The court 
could have exercised its equitable power to affirmatively order con­
tact, as the Supreme Judicial Court held on appeal was the trial 
judge’s duty upon making a finding that the contact was in the 
child’s best interests.89  Or, the court could have directed the appar­
ently willing agency and father to “enter[ ] into an agreement for 
post-termination contact or communication” under General Laws 
of Massachusetts chapter 210 section 3(d).90  Yet the trial court left 
what was clearly an important issue up to the discretion of an 
agency that had failed for nine years to find permanency for Rico 
(albeit at the time of the termination, it had failed for only six 
years). 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, only recognized the eq­
uitable method for effecting ongoing contact between Rico and his 
83. Adoption of Terrence, 787 N.E.2d 572, 578-79 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
84. Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. 2009). 
85. Id. at 553-55. 
86. Id. at 553. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 554-55. 
89. Id. at 560. 
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d) (2008). 
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family when it held that “the judge was obligated to enter” an order 
for “postadoption visitation or contact between Rico and his father, 
as well as among Rico and his siblings.”91  Although it is very likely 
that Rico will and should have contact with his father and siblings 
after adoption and that the family that adopts Rico should be open 
and willing to foster such a relationship,92 the court did not seem to 
consider the termination with contact method.  Perhaps the court 
felt strongly that post-adoption contact would have to be ordered if 
and when an adoptive family came forward to adopt Rico or, à la 
the appeals court’s reasoning in Adoption of Lars,93 that any family 
adopting Rico would be willing to allow his father and siblings into 
their extended kin network. 
In any event, the courts reviewing Rico’s case on appeal 
glossed over the statutory mechanism for agreeable visitation or­
ders.94  It seems that the long-recognized equitable authority for 
courts to order such contact has eclipsed the termination and adop­
tion with contact provision the legislature added in 1999.  Neverthe­
less, one of the lessons of open adoption, and particularly adoption 
with contact, is that often the child’s families—birth, foster, and 
adoptive—are in the optimal position to determine what is best for 
the child and the birth and adoptive families, including what types 
of arrangements will meet the needs of the families and the child. 
In contrast, courts and governmental agencies struggle under heavy 
caseloads and an unavoidable distance between bureaucratic func­
tioning and the lived lives of children and families. Rico could have 
provided the opportunity to place the plans for a child in the hands 
of the people closest to him.  Confronted with a child-welfare fail­
ure—a child in foster care for three-quarters of his life without re­
turning home or receiving an adoptive family—perhaps the 
reviewing courts had had enough, but they also may have missed an 
opportunity in the process. 
II. THE FAMILIES OF OPEN ADOPTION 
Despite the ongoing legal paradigm of the discrete nuclear 
family, social science recognizes that families are both fluid in for­
mation and porous in boundaries.95  This is particularly true of 
91. Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d at 560. 
92. Perhaps this was shorthand for what the Lars court articulated. 
93. Adoption of Lars, 702 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6C. 
95. See generally JUDITH STACEY, IN THE  NAME OF THE  FAMILY: RETHINKING 
FAMILY  VALUES IN THE  POSTMODERN  AGE (1996) (describing postmodern families); 
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adoptive families.  There do not appear to be any social science 
studies of the families who participate in legally regulated open 
adoption (adoption with contact or court-ordered post-adoption 
contact) in the United States.  There have been, however, a number 
of studies of unregulated open adoption here96 and of court-
imposed post-adoption contact in England,97 where the Children’s 
Act 1989 permits courts to order post-adoption contact without the 
express agreement of the adoptive parents.98 
These studies reveal a complex, fraught, and overall positive 
set of relationships and family formations.  The studies portray ex­
tended, dynamic kin networks that are inorganically created but 
evolve into multifocal extended families that are sometimes com­
fortable and sometimes uncomfortable, sometimes bitter and other 
times sweet.  These studies are also beginning to suggest lessons for 
social workers, lawyers, and courts regarding how to assist in the 
creation and maintenance of these families.  The following is a brief 
survey of the highlights of findings from studies here and abroad 
that might help illustrate how these new blended families of open 
adoption function. 
Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection: Heteronormativity, Same-
Sex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 289 (2008) [hereinafter 
Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection] (discussing the construction of kin­
ship networks around biological and social relationships in families where both birth 
parents do not live with the child). 
96. E.g., Jerica M. Berge et al., Adolescents’ Feelings About Openness in Adop­
tion: Implications for Adoption Agencies, 85 CHILD  WELFARE 1011, 1017 (2006) 
(describing Grotevant-McRoy’s large, longitudinal Minnesota-Texas Adoption Re­
search Project); Marianne Berry, The Practice of Open Adoption: Findings from a Study 
of 1396 Adoptive Families, 13 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 379 (1991) (reporting on 
one phase of large longitudinal study); Marianne Berry et al., The Role of Open Adop­
tion in the Adjustment of Adopted Children and Their Families, 20 CHILD. & YOUTH 
SERV. REV. 151 (1998) (four-year study of over 700 adoptions by nonfoster parents); 
Nora Dunbar et al., Processes Linked to Contact Changes in Adoptive Kinship Net­
works, 45 FAM. PROCESS 449 (2006) (part of Grotevant-McRoy longitudinal study of 
infant open adoptions); Xiaojia Ge et al., Bridging the Divide: Openness in Adoption 
and Postadoption Psychosocial Adjustment Among Birth and Adoptive Parents, 22 J. 
FAM. PSYCHOL. 529 (2008) (presenting data from the Early Growth and Development 
Study, which examined the correlation between the degree of openness and post-adop­
tion adjustment for birth and adoptive parents). 
97. Murray Ryburn, A Study of Post-Adoption Contact in Compulsory Adoptions, 
26 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 627, 639 (1996); Lois Wright et al., Adolescent Adoption and the 
Birthfamily, 1 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 35 (2007); see also SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 
34, at 53-69. R 
98. 1989, c. 41, §§ 8-11 (Eng.). 
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A. The Contact 
In the studies reported here, contact was ongoing after adop­
tion through voluntary arrangements or by court order.  In these 
ongoing contact studies, the contact ranged from exchange of let­
ters and phone calls to in-person visits, attendance at important 
rites of passage, overnight visits, and an enlargement of the kinship 
network.99  Moreover, in families with more than one adoptee, the 
range of contact might vary among children, and the families 
tended to view as optimal the most open of the relationships.100  It 
is not uncommon for members of the extended birth family to be 
part of the contact.101  In fact, the definition of birth family tends to 
be child-centered and might include adopted or at-home siblings, 
stepparents, foster siblings and other fictive kin, aunts, uncles, and 
grandparents.102  Where openness decreased, other members of the 
birth family might step into the contact.103 
The amount and type of contact both reflects and shapes the 
perspectives and relationships among the adults such that more 
open contact led to more positive adoptive-parent perceptions of 
the birth relatives.  For example, the “adoptive parents with closed 
adoptions were significantly more likely to have a negative or 
mostly negative view of the biological parent than adoptive parents 
with open adoptions.”104  In contrast, the greatest percentage of 
parents with positive views of the birth parents were those who had 
in-person contact.105 
In one study of foster-child adoptions, children placed in the 
first month of life were most likely to have open adoptions.106 
Studies of open adoptions of infants found that feelings about open­
ness were positive and that many adoptions were moving toward 
99. For example, per one adoptive mother: “‘For his 17th birthday they all came. 
That is, his birthmother, his two half-sisters, her current boyfriend.’  Another reported, 
‘I have contact with all my kids’ birthparents.  All of their birthfamilies are very much a 
part of their lives and our lives in one way or another.’”  Wright et al., supra note 97, at R 
50. 
100. Deborah H. Siegel, Open Adoption of Infants: Adoptive Parents’ Feelings 
Seven Years Later, 48 SOC. WORK 409, 415 (2003). 
101. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 121; Wright et al., supra note 97, at 47-48. R 
102. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 116; Wright et al., supra note 97, at 47-48. R 
103. Siegel, supra note 100, at 413-14. R 
104. Frasch et al., supra note 23, at 441. R 
105. Id. (sixty-eight percent of adoptive parents in in-person open adoptions felt 
positively about biological parents); Siegel, supra note 100, at 415 (noting overall satis- R 
faction and direction toward more openness). 
106. Frasch et al., supra note 23, at 438, 441. R 
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greater openness.107  Increases in contact were motivated by con­
cern for the child’s well-being, better communication, and good re­
lationships between the birth and adoptive parents.108  In fact, 
studies suggest that the more contact families had with each other, 
the more advantages and fewer disadvantages they attributed to the 
contact.109  Adoptive parents were also willing to increase court-
ordered or agreed contact at the request of the birth family.110 
Studies reveal that mediated adoptions tended to become fully 
disclosed, particularly when the adopted adolescents or the adop­
tive mothers initiated the increase.111  It is less likely for mediated 
contact adoptions to become closed, but it does occur.112  Research­
ers noted that decreases in contact were often caused by communi­
cations gaps that led to misunderstandings regarding the motives 
and intentions of the triad members.113 
In addition, as the adoptee enters adolescence, studies show 
that they gain authority regarding contact.  In other words, as chil­
dren age, the adults look to the adoptee to set the terms and pace 
and are less and less involved with the actual contact.114  By the 
time adoptees are adolescents, they are better able to manage the 
complications of the birth-parent relationship.  As one adoptive 
mother noted, “I used to ‘vet’ the letters as some are quite strange, 
but now that she is older she has them direct.”115  Similarly, another 
mother said, “Last time . . . she went by herself to her mother’s flat, 
but this was less successful as they found they did not communicate 
well without my help.”116  At some point, there is a transition that 
installs the adolescent adoptee as the driver of the amount and type 
of contact, something both the adoptive and birth parents seem to 
107. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 454, 462; Siegel, supra note 100, 415-16. R 
108. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 451. R 
109. Ryburn, supra note 97, at 634-35. R 
110. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 121. R 
111. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 454; Siegel, supra note 100, at 414. R 
112. See Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 451.  When adoptive parents felt pres- R 
sured to enter into an open adoption as a condition of receiving a baby, birth parents 
initiated the decreases. Id. 
113. Id. at 461.  Dunbar et al. summed it up: “It was both striking and poignant 
that network members may become distanced from one another because of inaccurate 
perceptions about each other’s intentions regarding contact.” Id.  These misperceptions 
were most likely in mediated adoptions. Id. 
114. Id. at 459-60. 
115. Ryburn, supra note 97, at 633. R 
116. Id. at 632. 
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understand and accept.117  This transfer of authority appears to 
work well as long as the adolescent knows that he or she is in con­
trol of, and has the information needed to effect, the contact.118 
B. The Adoptive Parents 
The level of openness did not appear to affect parental satisfac­
tion with adoption or the closeness of their connection with the 
adoptee.119  No matter how the openness came to be—through 
court order or agreement—the adoptive parents viewed the contact 
as beneficial.  In one study, sixty-seven percent of the adopters felt 
satisfied and comfortable with the contact.120  Several parents felt 
discomfort but felt overall that contact was good, positive, and ben­
eficial to the children.121  Those adoptive parents who had ongoing 
contact tended to be more sympathetic and less negative toward 
their children’s birth parents while those without contact had more 
negative views.122  Adoptive parents also noted that the contact 
helped them become closer to their children because they could 
better understand their children and also speak knowledgably with 
them about their birth families.123 
Moreover, adoptive parents understood that their children had 
connections to their pre-adoptive kin and helped them remain in 
contact with birth parents, siblings, and grandparents.124  Those 
who adopted adolescents “believed that adopting an adolescent 
meant also adopting his or her family, including birthparents, sib­
lings, and extended family.”125  Adoptive parents were active in 
helping children maintain contact with siblings adopted into other 
homes.126  In one study, adoptive parents wanted more contact for 
117. See Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 459-60 (quoting birth and adoptive par- R 
ents sharing their views of the adoptee’s role in contact and the purpose of that 
contact). 
118. See id. at 460 (describing adoptive parents who had not shared sufficient 
information with the adoptee to allow him or her to make the transition, including facts 
such as contact information or that the birth parent actually was interested in contact 
with the adoptee). 
119. Frasch et al., supra note 23, at 440. R 
120. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 98-99. R 
121. Id.; Ryburn, supra note 97, at 644. R 
122. Ryburn, supra note 97, at 639. R 
123. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 93. R 
124. Id. at 87-89; Ryburn, supra note 97, at 631-32. R 
125. Wright et al., supra note 97, at 46. R 
126. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 92, 96-97; Ryburn, supra note 97, at 633. R 
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their adolescent children or thought the amount of contact should 
be up to the children.127 
Studies regarding court-ordered open adoptions illustrate that 
control is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of parenting for the 
adoptive parents.  In other words, it is not the exclusivity of 
parenthood but, instead, “the phenomenology of parenthood [that] 
is intrinsically characterised by a sense of ownership and con­
trol.”128  Thus, the vast majority of the adopters in one study were 
opposed to court-ordered contact, even when they recognized the 
benefits of it.129  On the other hand, in another study of court-
ordered contact, adoptive parents indicated that their views about 
contact were most negative at the beginning but had tempered over 
time, so they believed that an initial decision against contact should 
not be irrevocable.130 
C. The Adoptees 
Most of the studies are of the adults and not the adoptees, so 
there is less to say about their views directly, but the studies that do 
engage youth suggest that adoptees are interested in their birth 
families and that, especially as they age, they are interested in con­
tact.131  Researchers Smith and Logan summed up the complicated 
feelings adopted children have about their adoptive and birth kin: 
Children’s accounts of their feelings about adoption and 
contact suggest that, for most of them, their everyday lives were 
not clouded by a significant sense of loss.  However, when we 
asked them if they ever worried about anything[,] thirty-six (61 
per cent) children identified issues associated with adoption or 
their birth families. . . . Direct contact went some way towards 
quelling these worries for many children and adoptive parents 
were aware of its importance in this respect.132 
Most children in one study were happy about being adopted 
and happy with the post-adoption contact.133  Even children who 
were happy with their adoption “expressed distress or ambivalence 
about the decision to place them for adoption and the loss of their 
127. Grotevant et al., supra note 14, at 92-93. R 
128. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 105. R 
129. Id. 
130. Ryburn, supra note 97, at 638. R 
131. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 26-27; Berge et al., supra note 96, at R 
1016. 
132. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 144. R 
133. Id. at 133, 140-41, 148-50. 
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birth families.”134  Indeed, children’s own statements suggest that 
they wanted to be both with their birth parents and with their adop­
tive parents.135  A majority of the children who had direct contact 
with their birth relatives wanted more frequent contact;136 a major­
ity also felt transitory feelings of distress at the end of visits.137  A 
minority of the children were distressed by contact with their par­
ents, but some felt more comfortable regarding contact with siblings 
or other relatives.138 
Studies illustrate that adoptees in their adolescent years have a 
strong interest in their birth parents, even when they are not in con­
tact.139  Studies also indicate that the adoptees are happier when 
they have direct contact with their birth parents.140  In one study, 
adolescents with direct contact described the role of their birth 
mothers in their lives most frequently as “a close or special friend,” 
less frequently, as an “acquaintance or casual friend,” or “a rela­
tive,” “another parent,” or “a birth mother.”141  Just under ten per­
cent of the adolescent adoptees in that study described their mother 
as having “no role” in their lives.142  Adoptees who were not in con­
tact viewed the in-contact birth parents of their adoptive siblings as 
surrogates for their own birth parents.143  Some children adopted as 
adolescents refused to consent to their adoption if it meant they 
would not be able to continue to see their siblings and other 
relatives.144 
D. The Birth Family 
The birth parents have the least control in these relationships, 
particularly those that are not regulated (i.e., enforceable).  Unlike 
adoptive parents who might prefer for contact not to be court or­
dered, birth parents and birth relatives were more likely to want 
134. Id. at 134. 
135. Id. at 136-37. 
136. Id. at 144; see also Grotevant et al., supra note 14, at 93. R 
137. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 144. R 
138. Id. at 140-41. 
139. See id. at 144; Berge et al., supra note 96, at 1029-31; Grotevant et al., supra R 
note 14, at 92. R 
140. Tai J. Mendenhall et al., Adolescents’ Satisfaction with Contact in Adoption, 
21 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 175, 186-88 (2004). 
141. Grotevant et al., supra note 14, at 88. R 
142. Id. 
143. Jerica M. Berge et al., Adolescent Sibling Narratives Regarding Contact in 
Adoption, 9(2/3) ADOPTION Q. 81, 89-95 (2006). 
144. Wright et al., supra note 97, at 52. R 
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court orders to protect their rights to visit.145  It is not surprising 
then that they felt as if they had less control over the relationship 
and felt less satisfied with the contact.146  At the same time, the 
contact helped them to accept the adoptions after seeing their chil­
dren “happy and well settled.”147  This contact helped the birth par­
ents to accept adoptions that they had earlier contested.148 
In addition, the adoptive family becomes the focal point of 
connection between families such that birth parents experienced 
the adoptive parents to be more concerned about controlling the 
boundaries of the adoptive family and less attentive to birth-family 
boundaries.149  In any event, birth parents do seem to feel a part of 
the adoptive family as indicated by their interaction with their birth 
children’s siblings150 and their feeling of “a familial connection with 
their biological child’s adoptive family.”151  One birth mother 
claimed of the family that adopted her child: “I feel like they could 
be relatives of mine.”152 Birth parents also brought other members 
of their family into contact with the children they relinquished for 
adoption.153 
E. The New Blended Families of Adoption 
This brief rehearsal of findings from social studies of open 
adoption suggests that the adoptive family of the open-adoption era 
is not the nuclear family of the mythic American family lore.  Lead­
ing adoption researchers Harold Grotevant and Ruth McRoy call 
this the “adoption kinship network” and describe it as a network 
with “the child at the center of a family system that includes his or 
her adoptive parents, siblings, and extended family as well as his or 
her birth parents, siblings, and extended family, whether the indi­
viduals are known to one another or not.”154 
In both foster care and private adoptions, the birth and adop­
tive families come together around important rites of passage as 
well as everyday events.  The birth mother’s sister might even 
145. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 122. R 
146. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 458. R 
147. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 117. R 
148. See id. 
149. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 457-58. R 
150. See Berge et al., supra note 143, at 90-91 (illustrating how birth mothers R 
identify and treat their birth children’s adoptive siblings as kin). 
151. Id. at 91. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 90. 
154. Grotevant et al., supra note 14, at 81. R 
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babysit while the adoptive mother is away.155  In short, open adop­
tion is becoming normal and represents one type of family among 
many others created through divorce and remarriage, kinship care, 
and lesbian- and gay-headed families—which by definition have at 
least one parent or gamete donor who is not part of the 
household.156 
As one researcher observed, “Birth and adoptive family rela­
tionships in open adoptions are likely to be as complex and varied 
as relationships among spouses, parents and children, siblings, and 
other family members in different family arrangements.”157  She 
suggests that professionals working with these families embrace 
rather than reject these phenomena.  At the same time, they should 
not be too directive about a type or level of contact.158  Instead, 
professionals should talk to the adopters about the uniqueness of 
adoption, what the family needs and wants at the current time, and 
what it might want in the future.159  The social worker’s role should 
be to facilitate a process by which families can reach out to one 
another and then help them develop plans and procedures to 
achieve those objectives.160 
Open-adoption researchers Smith and Logan, who recommend 
and prefer voluntary rather than court-imposed contact,161 find that 
even under court-ordered contact, 
[a]dopters are less likely to find contact problematic when they 
have been fully involved in discussions about the details and pur­
pose of contact arrangements and where they do not feel com­
pelled to accept contact as a condition of placement.  This also 
requires social workers to undertake thorough discussions with 
birth relatives about their hopes and expectations for the 
future.162 
Along these lines, England and Wales, where most adoptions 
are from foster care, passed a law in 2002 that requires post-adop­
tion contact to be considered when planning for adoption and man­
dates that agencies provide post-adoption support for the 
155. Siegel, supra note 100, at 414. R 
156. See generally Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection, supra note 
95, at 302-15. R 
157. Siegel, supra note 100, at 417. R 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 182. R 
162. Id. at 183. 
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families.163  This policy decision represents the recognition that 
post-adoption contact is valuable and that social service agencies 
have a role in supporting the adoptive kin network.  In the United 
States, which has a diverse array of paths to and in adoption, regu­
lating and supporting the adoptive kin network is a complicated but 
worthy and timely endeavor. 
CONCLUSION 
There are clearly benefits to voluntary, but enforceable, adop­
tion with contact and also—particularly in the case of foster-child 
adoptions—court-imposed post-termination or post-adoption con­
tact.  As the British experience reveals, despite its disregard of fam­
ily autonomy, court-ordered post-adoption contact at the time of 
adoption does not undermine the adoptive parents’ legitimacy and 
has overall positive outcomes.  Massachusetts seems to have an op­
timal regulatory scheme in that it provides for adoption with con­
tact—post-adoption-contact agreements that are enforceable—and 
for equitable court-imposed post-adoption contact in those in­
stances where contact agreements are not feasible.  Massachusetts 
law also provides for termination of parental rights with contact, a 
vehicle that helps protect important family relationships between 
termination and adoption.  Unfortunately, Adoption of Rico missed 
an opportunity to examine those various options and instead fell 
back on the equitable authority of the courts to order visits as if the 
legislature had never intervened. 
The courts are in a unique, and sometimes the best, position to 
protect children’s legal rights and interests in foster care and adop­
tion.  The courts can do so directly or by authorizing the persons 
closest to the child to protect those interests.  The trial court in Rico 
did neither while the Supreme Judicial Court surprisingly ruled that 
the trial court was duty-bound to order post-adoption contact even 
when there was no adoptive family before it.  The court opined that 
there was just one option: for the trial court to enter an order for a 
future that was still unknown and unknowable.  In so doing, the 
court missed an opportunity to engage the people and agencies 
working with Rico directly and to educate them about collaborative 
planning in and for adoption. 
163. Elsbeth Neil, Supporting Post-Adoption Contact for Children Adopted From 
Care: A Study of Social Workers’ Attitudes, 10(3-4) ADOPTION Q. 3, 4-5 (2007). 
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